Robinson: Commentary

"I'd be a better person if I weren't turned on by
these pictures; after all, the personalities, which are
what really ought to count in eroticism, are not
represented." We can also imagine an erotophobe
who thinks 'These are natural human activities, I
would be a better person if I related more positively
to this material." That is, morality may crosscut the
witnessing reaction. Again, it is only the analogue
of the witnessing reaction that is properly included
in the contractors' deliberations.
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I take the general thesis of Professor Robinson's
comments to be this: in conceding so much to Carruthers
for the sake of the argument, I have provided the
contractarian with sufficient grounds on which to
overcome the initially plausible-looking objections I
have raised (or at least I have failed to show that I
haven't provided such grounds). In keeping with the
spirit of his comments, then, I will limit myself here to
the narrow question of whether Robinson has succeeded
in hoisting me not so much with my own petard, as
with the one I have tentatively accepted on loan from
the contractarian.

2 The question arises whether the suggested way of
maintaining a distinction between the cases of animals and
marginal humans can be attributed to Carruthers. It is true
that he does not crisply distinguish content of principies from
type of justification and type of attitude that goes with them.
Nonetheless, I think (but shall not argue in any detail) that
my discussion is quite in accord with Carruthers' views. I
note that in P. Carruthers, The Animals Issue (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1992), the pages from 110 to
118, which deal mostly with marginal humans, are filled with
talk about rights. The section on animals and character (pp.
153-156) is, by contrast, focused upon cruelty and sympathy.
A notable exception occurs near the beginning of p. 154. Here,
however, the kind of wrongness that cruelty to animals has,
and that is to be further discussed in this section, is explicitly
contrasted with Violation of rights.

I.
My first argument maintained that if the contracting
agents would decide to avoid the risk of being distressed
by the sight of animals suffering for trivial reasons in
public, then they would also decide to avoid the risk of
being distressed by their knowledge that animals are
suffering for trivial reasons in private. Robinson's
objection, I think, can best be summarized in the form
of a dilemma: either I am relying on there being a moral
aversion to this suffering, in which case I am reneging
on my commitment to argue the issue on the
contractarian's own terms, or I am appealing to a
nonmoral aversion, in which case I have failed to
account for the fact that, in general, what is done out of
sight is less emotionally distressing than what is done
in full view.
I will focus on the first hom of the dilemma and
make a brief comment about the second. With respect
to the first, I think that there is a way for me to appeal
to the existence of a moral aversion to private animal
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suffering while retaining my commitment to arguing
on Carruthers' own terms. Robinson argues that the
contractors themselves cannot have a moral repugnance
to factory farming (or to anything else). And on this
point he is surely correct. But even if qua contractors
they can have no such repugnance, they may still worry
that after the veil of ignorance is lifted they will find
themselves to be people who do find factory farming
morally repugnant, and so from behind the veil they
can worry that outside of the veil they will be morally
distressed by it.
Now this strategy may at first seem simply to beg
the question against Carruthers all over again, but I
believe that it does not: Carruthers has argued, after
all, that many people do feel sympathy for animals, and
that those who do can "easily" come to believe that
animal suffering has moral standing (p. 157). Carruthers
himself argues that this belief is an "illusion," to be
sure, but he has also insisted that when deliberating from
behind the veil of ignorance the contractors must take
into account how the principles they consider "might
be distorted or abused" (p. lIS). In response to
Robinson's observation, then, I suggest that the
contractors in question must consider that in endorsing
a character which is sympathetic to animal suffering,
they are endorsing a character which makes it likely
that many people will come (albeit distortedly) to
believe that animal suffering is morally important, and
so to be morally repelled by factory farming. As a
contractor, then, I do have reason to worry that I will
be morally distressed by factory farming once I get
beyond the veil, even though as a contractor behind the
veil I am not morally distressed by it or by anything else.
A brief remark about the second horn of the
dilemma: although I can't defend the claim here, I
suspect that the suffering that an animal is typically
subjected to in a factory farm is far greater than the
sort of suffering which, when seen in public, suffices
to generate a nonmoral emotional aversion. While we
are more distressed by seeing· a dog kicked than by
knowing that one is being kicked, then, we may be
more or less equally distressed by seeing a dog kicked
and by knowing about the far more serious harms being
done to veal calves or intensely farmed chickens. An
emotional, nonmoral aversion to the knowledge of
such suffering, then, may suffice for my purposes
even given the fact that, all things being equal, what
is done out of sight is less distressing than what is
done in plain view.
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My second argument maintained, to follow Robinson's
useful terminology, that if contracting agents would
agree to criticize the character trait of brutality, and thus
to condemn the sorts of acts which arise from it, then
they would for the same reason agree to condemn the
character trait of trivial indifference, and thus to
condemn those who support factory farming from it.
To this Robinson replies that while we can certainly
agree that trivial indifference to animal suffering is a
moral flaw, we cannot allow the contracting agents
themselves to believe this, and he adds that it seems
plausible to suppose that contractors would in fact have
substantially less to fear from those who are trivially
indifferent toward animals than from those who are
brutal toward them.
I think I can accept both of these observations.
Carruthers gives as examples of actions which he takes
to be shown to be wrong by his account both the driver
who hits a dog with his car for fun, and the driver who
after accidentally hitting a dog with his car, considers
stopping to help the dog but decides not to because he
is late for an appointment with his barber (p. 154).
Now it seems to me open to Carruthers to say both
that the contractors themselves would not believe that
either person was morally flawed and that they would
have more to fear from the first sort of person than
from the second. Still, provided that they would just
as soon not have to count on getting help when they
need it from the second sort of person either, the
contractors would have reason to criticize that sort of
person as well. The second person allows the animal
to suffer out of a motive that is trivial, and my
suggestion was, and remains, that this is what people
do by supporting factory farming.
HI.
My final argument maintained that if marginal humans
have full moral standing for the reasons that Carruthers
provides, then so do animals. Robinson considers this
to be the most important of my arguments, so it will
come as something of an anti-climax for me to conclude
by saying that on this issue I believe we are essentially
in agreement. Nonetheless, I do believe that on this issue
we are essentially in agreement.
The reason that this is not immediately apparent, I
think, lies in a confusion in Carruthers' terminology.
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Carruthers begins his book with the following
statement:

on the back of the cover begins: "Do animals bave
rights? In contrast to the philosophical gurus of the
animal rights movement, whose opinion bas held moral
sway in recent years, Peter Carruthers here claims that
they do not" (one wonders where all this swaying has
been taking place; certainly not in most of the
philosophy departments I am familiar with). My claim
is that if marginal humans have rights, then so do
animals, even if they don't have all the same rights.
And so, in this sense, their moral status is the same.
Now this conclusion, to be sure, may not be strong
enough to satisfy the aforementioned animal rights
"gurus," but, to reiterate (and to conclude), my point here
bas not been to recommend moral contraetarianism to
these gurus, but rather to suggest that it does not serve
their opponents as well as Carruthers claims it does.

The task of this book is to consider whether
animals have moral standing -that is,
whether they have rights that we may infringe
by killing them or causing them suffering, or
whether there is some other way in which we
have direct moral duties towards them (p. 1).
Now it is true, as I noted in my paper, that Canuthers
often uses the expression "full moral standing" rather
than just "moral standing," but he seems to use them
interchangeably. At one point in the preface he says he
will "defend a theoretical framework that accords fUll
moral standing to all human beings, while non-arbitrarily
withholding such standing from animals," but the passage
continues with the very next sentence beginning, "In
attacking those who attribute moral standing to
animals...," as if he means to be denying the claim that
animals have any moral standing at all (p. xii).
The question, then, is this: does denying that
animals have full moral standing commit one to
denying that they have any moral standing at all? In
one sense, the answer is no. This is the sense whicb
refers to the content of the duties we may have toward
them. We might have some duties to animals but not
the full list of duties that we have toward marginal
humans. This is the sense that Robinson focuses on,
and I accept his conclusion that contractors would
accept more restrictions on their treatment of marginal
humans than on their treatment of animals. In this
sense, the moral status of marginal humans would be
"more full" than the moral status of animals.
But in another sense, the answer is yes. In this
sense, having moral standing means being a possessor
of rigbts or an object of direct moral importance, and
this property does not come in degrees: one either has
it or does not have it. My moral standing cannot be
more fully direct than yours, though I can be the object
of more direct duties than you are; even if you have
more rights than I do, I have the rights that I do have
just as fully as you have the rights that you have.
This is the sense in which I deny that Carruthers'
argument succeeds. I take Carruthers to be arguing that
animals are of no direct moral significance, that they
possess no rights at all, not just that they possess fewer
rights than marginal humans do. This is certainly how
Carruthers' publisher is pitching the book. The copy
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